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lective-bargaining process. 51 In addition, the NLRB has a broad power of
investigation and the authority and ability to urge, through the regional
director, informal settlements of grievances and to provide expeditious
hearings.52 Furthermore, besides these administrative advantages, the Board,
as a single agency, would be more effective than geographically scattered
and ideologically diverse courts in establishing workable, consistent standards
of fair representation. 53 Thus, it is evident that legislative history, national
labor policy, statutory language, and jurisdictional desirability all support
the holding of Local 12 that the duty of fair representation implicit in section
9 is reflected by a correlative right in section 7, thereby making a breach of
that duty an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b) (1) (A).
JOHN J. REID
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act—Norris-LaGuardia Act—Injunction
Against Secondary Labor Boycott.—Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 1—The Florida East Coast Railway (FEC).
the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad (ACL), the Seaboard Air Line Railroad
(SAL), and the Southern Railway each owned twenty-five per cent of the
stock of the Jacksonville Terminal Company, a Florida corporation. Under
contracts called "Operating and Guaranty Agreements," the Terminal Com-
pany provided certain services and facilities to the four stockholding railroads
as well as to the Georgia Southern and Florida Railway.."-- In anticipation of
a strike against it by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, FEC obtained
an injunction against the Terminal Company and the other three stockholding
railroads, requiring them to perform the terms of the "Operating and
Guaranty Agreements." 3
The Brotherhood struck FEC after the exhaustion of the statutory
procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, at which point neither
party had any recourse under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 4 The union
51 Sec Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsi-
bility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1358-59 (1958).
13Iumrosen, supra note 27, at 1514.
Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VIM L. Rev. 151, 173 (1957).
1 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
2 These services and facilities included, for example, freight interchange, track main-
tenance, switching and repair services, and "car service" as defined by the Interstate
Commerce Act, 40 Stat. 101 (1917), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(10) (1964). 362 F.2(1
at 650.
3 No opinion was published in that case.
Although the lower court's order specifically purported to bind the employees
of both the defendant Terminal Company and the Railroad defendants, the
court denied an application by the union representatives of said employees to
intervene in an attempt to dissolve this injunction . . . It was not appealed,
since the brotherhoods were not permitted to intervene, and thus there was
no aggrieved party.
Id. at 651.
4 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964). For the history of
this dispute between FEC and its employees, see Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States,
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then began to picket the terminal with the express purpose of persuading the
employees of both the Terminal Company and its stockholder railroads to
perform no services for FEC and of thereby inducing these employers to
agree to provide no services for FEC.5 The picketing was effective and
caused "hundreds" of these employees to refuse to work.
Immediately, the Terminal Company, ACL, and SAL obtained an
injunction in the federal district court to prohibit this picketing. 6 On the
union's appeal from this order, the court of appeals reversed. HELD•
Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,' a federal court has no jurisdiction to
enjoin a secondary labor boycott on the suit of a secondary employer engaged
in the same industry as the primary employer. The court also held that
Norris-LaGuardia forbids the injunction where, as here, there is an "economic
self-interest" in the outcome of the primary dispute on the part of the
secondary employers on the one hand and their employees on the other. The
court rejected as irrelevant arguments that the secondary boycott was in
violation of the policies of the RLA and the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) . 8
The dissent argued that the injunction was not forbidden by Norris-
LaGuardia, and that the policies of the RLA and the ICA required that it
issue.
There are two separate issues in this case: (1) whether the Norris-
LaGuardia Act by its terms forbids the injunction to issue; and (2) if it
does, whether the policies of the RLA and the ICA require that the injunc-
tion issue notwithstanding Norris-LaGuardia. With regard to the first
question, there would seem to be no doubt that literally Norris-LaGuardia
prohibits the injunction, yet the strong dissent merits further investigation.
Section 4 of the act provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person
348 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd sub nom. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966), 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 153 (1966);
Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964).
5 The specific purpose of the appellants' picketing in this case is highlighted
by the testimony of Mr. Raymond C. Moore, Deputy President, Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen, given at the Preliminary Injunction hearing, to the
effect that if the Terminal Company "cease to provide services * * * for the
FEC and cease to handle movement of FEC trains on its property," the pickets
would be removed.
362 F.2d at 651.
o There was no published opinion.
The District Court, without elaborating, held that the Norris-LaGuardia
prohibition was "not applicable to the instant proceedings * * *" and enjoined
the picketing, presumably upon the basis that it unlawfully interfered with legal
obligations which the appellees owed the FEC by virtue of (a) the Operating
and Guaranty Agreement; (b) the Interstate Commerce Act; and (c) the
injunction previously [obtained by FEC]. . . .
Id. at 652.
7 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. II 101-15 (1964).
8 "Mt should be emphasized that we here deal only with the enjoinability of
appellants' activity and not with its legality for any other purpose." 362 F.2d at 653.
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or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms
are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of
the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in
any relation of employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved
in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or any other method not involving fraud or
violence;
(i ) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing with-
out fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified. . . 9
(Emphasis added.)
Since the injunction granted by the district court clearly prohibited
acts enumerated in subsections (a), (e), and (i) above, the terms of the
statute limit the questions to two: (1) are defendants "persons participating
or interested in" a labor dispute? and (2) does the instant case "involve or
grow out of a labor dispute"? If either question is answered in the negative,
then section 4 does not prohibit the injunction.
Section 13 of the act compels affirmative answers to both questions.
Subsection (b), which defines "persons participating or interested" in a
labor dispute, clearly includes the defendant union and its member employees:
A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or
interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and
if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation
in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest
therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed
in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such
industry, trade, craft, or occupation.'"
If there is any question of what the dispute is in which defendants are
participating, the answer is supplied by subsection (c) of section 13, which
provides that "the term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment.. . ."" This clearly includes the defendant
Brotherhood's strike of FEC. Therefore, defendants are persons participating
or interested in a labor dispute, and the applicability of Norris-LaGuardia
depends upon the second question: whether the case involves or grows out
of that labor dispute. Here the key definition is provided by section 13(a):
A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute
when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same in-
dustry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests
therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are
9 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 US.C. § 104 (1964).
io 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1964).
11 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1964).
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members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or
employees; ... or when the case involves any conflicting or com-
peting interests in a "labor dispute" (as hereinafter defined) of
"persons participating or interested" therein (as hereinafter de-
fined)." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that the instant case is within this definition. In fact, it is un-
necessary to look beyond the fact that the litigants are engaged in the same
industry in order to apply the definition." Once it has been found that the
defendants are persons participating in a labor dispute, section 4 applies
and the injunction is prohibited.
The dissent argued, however, that Norris-LaGuardia did not by its
terms govern the instant case, but it is submitted that this argument is
based upon a misstatement of the questions involved in determining whether
section 4 applies. As previously noted, section 4 applies if the defendants
are participants in a labor dispute as defined in subsections (b) and (c) of
section 13, and if the case itself involves that labor dispute as defined in
section 13(a). On this point, however, the dissent insisted upon reading
section 4 as applying only if the case involved or grew out of a labor
dispute as defined in section 13(c), ignoring the clearly applicable definition
in section 13(a). Beginning with this misconstruction, it concluded that the
question was: "whether this action is between persons involved in a labor
dispute or; whether the subject matter of the litigation involves or grows
out of a labor dispute in which appellants and appellees are participating or
interested."" (Emphasis added.) Not only is the dissent's framing of the
issues unsupported by the words of Norris-LaGuardia, but there does not
appear to be a single case in which such a requirement was imposed or even
hinted at."
A careful reading of the entire dissenting opinion reveals, however, that
its analysis of the literal words of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not seriously
detrimental to its essential reasoning. As previously noted, the issue of
whether Norris-LaGuardia literally applies is only the first issue in this case;
the second issue is whether, assuming literal applicability, certain policy
reasons require that it not govern the instant case. The dissent addresses
itself primarily to the contention that literal application of the act "leads to
the indefensible result that appellant-brotherhoods can picket and close
12 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1964).
13 To apply §§ 4 and 13, therefore, it was not necessary for the court to find that the
secondary employers and their employees had an economic self-interest in the outcome
of the FEC dispute.
14 362 F.2d at 656. It is possible that the majority's discussion of the economic
self-interest test was partly in response to the dissent's argument based upon the dissent's
statement of the issue.
15 The dissent cited United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947),
quoting from that opinion a statement which seems to support the contention that
both parties to the case must be parties to the dispute. 362 F.2d at 658. The issue there,
however, was whether the labor dispute, not the case, involved "persons." The Court
concluded that it did not, because the government, against whom the union was
striking, is not a "person." 330 U.S. at 275.
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down any terminal anywhere in the nation through which an FEC car
passes." 1° Thus, it is essentially arguing the second issue and not the first.
Examination, therefore, must now be made into the federal policies inherent
in the RLA, the ICA, and Section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 17
The RLA has been held to warrant an exception to Norris-LaGuardia
in certain cases. The exception, broadly stated, is that when a particular
provision of the RLA is unenforceable without the use of an injunction, the
court may disregard the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition and issue an in-
junction calculated to enforce that provision. 18 However, an examination of
the cases so holding indicates that this exception to Norris-LaGuardia is not
applicable in the instant litigation.
The first such case was Virginian Ry. v. Systems Fed'n No. 40. 10 There
the Court was faced with a railroad's interference with its employees'
selection of a collective-bargaining representative, a direct violation of
Section 2, Ninth of the RLA, 2° for which Congress had provided no remedy.
The Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended to make the
violation unremediable, and issued an injunction against the interference.
This reasoning was buttressed with the rule of construction that the specific
(RLA, Section 2, Ninth) governs the general (Norris-LaGuardia). 21
The cases since Virginian Ry. have adhered closely to the rule that an
injunction forbidden by Norris-LaGuardia will issue only if a mandatory
and specific section of a federal statute, or a binding order of a federal
agency, would be otherwise unenforceable. 22 As an illustration of this rule,
it is instructive to compare two 1957 Supreme Court decisions: Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R.23 and Manion v. Kansas
City Terminal Ry.24
 The cases involved similar disputes, both of which were
within the terms of Norris-LaGuardia. In both cases the injunction was
sought against a striking union. In the Chicago River case, the dispute had
been submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, while in
Manion it had not. In the former case, the Court reasoned that, because a
specific provision of the RLA made a decision of the Board final and binding
on both parties, an injunction against the strike must issue to preserve the
Board's jurisdiction. In the latter case, however, since the dispute had not
16 362 F.2d at 657.
11 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(6) (4) (1964).
18 For a complete analysis of the conflict of the RLA with this and other sections
of Norris-LaGuardia, see Note, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 264 (1965); Note, 70 Yale L.J. 70, 76
(1960).
16 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
20 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1964). Note that Norris-
LaGuardia forbids injunctions against employers as well as employees.
21 300 U.S. at 563.
22 The cases of Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and Graham v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949), are not relevant here, be-
cause they involve a finding that Norris-LaGuardia does not forbid injunctions against
deprivations of constitutional rights even though arising out of a labor dispute.
23 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
24 353 U.S. 927 (1957).
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been submitted to the Board, the Court found no violation of any specific
provision of the RLA and refused to enjoin the strike. 25
The limits of this exception have been closely observed by the courts,
and no case can stand as authority for the proposition that action by RLA-
employers or employees is enjoinable, unless that action violates a specific
provision of the RLA. There is no such violation in the present case.
Recognizing this, the dissenting judge based his argument on a violation of
the "policy" of the RLA and the ICA—presumably the policy against
interruption of interstate commerce which pervades both statutes. Actually,
the dissenting judge was advocating an extension of the exception to Norris-
LaGuardia discussed above; he would find the exception compelled by the
policies of the relevant statutes rather than by some specific provision only.
The suggested extension, however, is completely without the justification
which supported the previous cases. As has been shown, those cases were
based on two familiar rules: ( 1) no right given by Congress will be vitiated
for want of a remedy, or, perhaps, ubi jus ibi renzedium; and (2) the rule of
construction that the specific governs the general. To say that the policy
against interruption of interstate commerce is a federally created right which
in all cases demands a remedy is patently incorrect. Moreover, even if it
could be said that, in this case, the policy is sufficiently weighty to override
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, this requires that the second rule be reversed and
that the general policy govern the more specific terms of Norris-LaGuardia.
Therefore, an extension of the exception based merely upon the policies of
the RLA and the ICA is unsupportable.
The dissent's arguments for extending the exception, however, are based
not only on these policies, but also on the policy against the secondary labor
boycott. That policy is strong and undeniable. Section 8(b)(4) of the
Taft-Hartley Act26 outlaws as an unfair labor practice virtually every
secondary labor boycott. In fact, if the instant case were governed by Taft-
Hartley instead of the RLA, section 8(b)(4) would allow the plaintiff-
employers to seek a cease-and-desist order from the National Labor Re-
lations Board. 27 The dilemma is clear. Taft-Hartley, which does not cover
the instant case, clearly outlaws the secondary boycott; the RLA, which
covers a field that includes the instant case, is silent. The dissent reasons
from these circumstances that only inadvertence prevented Congress from
25 The same rationale has been applied to binding orders of the ICC. See, e.g.,
Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 170 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied sub nom. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 336 U.S. 944
(1949).
25 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(4) (1964).
22 Although the exemption is not as broad as it once was, the NLRB of necessity
has no jurisdiction over disputes between RLA-employers and RLA-employees, since
these fall within the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board and the
National Mediation Board. For excellent coverage of the secondary-boycott problem and
the 1959 amendments to Taft-Hartley, which give some protection to secondarily
boycotted RLA-employers, see Farmer, Secondary Boycotts—Loopholes Closed or
Reopened? 52 Geo. L.J. 392 (1964).
Neither the instant case nor this note deals with the question of whether the union's
action would in fact be a violation of § 8(b) (4). See note S supra.
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outlawing the secondary boycott in the RLA case. As in most questions of
legislative intent, arguments on both sides are persuasive, and it is possible
to conclude that the dissent is correct in its assessment of Congress' opinion
of the secondary labor boycott.28 It is not this step, but the next step in the
dissent's reasoning which is fallacious: that if Congress intended to outlaw
the secondary labor boycott, the injunction must issue. The fallacy lies in
the easy assumption that the injunction is the proper remedy. There is, in
fact, ample evidence for the opposite conclusion, for even those statutes
which offer preventive protection against secondary boycotts do so not by
means of judicial injunctions, but by orders made by agencies expert in the
field of labor relations.
It is such an easily performed logical leap from the premise that some-
thing ought to be done about the secondary labor boycott to the conclusion
that what ought to be done is the issuance of an injunction, that one might
forget that there is an equally strong policy prohibiting that conclusion—
the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia. 29 Moreover, to permit an
injunction to issue on the combined strengths of the policies of section
8(b) (4), the RLA, and the ICA would require a total reversal of what has
been a congressional policy for over thirty years—namely, that federal labor
policy is not determined by the courts, but by administrative boards set up
by Congress.a°
In short, Congress has set down a rule in the form of a statute, which
includes not only a policy against an injunction such as was sought in the
instant case, but also a policy against having courts make the sort of decision
which the issuance of an injunction here requires. A decision in favor of issuing
the injunction would disregard the limitations which have been placed on the
judiciary with regard to labor disputes. The proper forum for the remedy of
the secondary-boycott gap in the RLA, or the RLA-gap in Section 8(b)(4)
of Taft-Hartley, whichever it may be, is Congress rather than the courts.
That is the policy dictated by Congress in Norris-LaGuardia.
JOHN R. SHAUGHNESSY, JR.
28 The dissent bases its arguments primarily on a few statements made on the
floor of the House and Senate during the debates on the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
However, a thorough reading of the entire record of these debates leaves one with the
impression that Congress had no intent to exempt secondary boycotts from its coverage.
See 75 Cong. Rec. 4502-11, 4996-5019 (1932) (debates in Senate); 75 Cong. Rec.
5462-515 (1932) (debates in House).
29 The reason and strength of that policy are well outlined in Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
30 See id. at 209, 210; 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
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